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Abstract 
Behind rising natural rate of unemployment, they often point out the decline in matching 
efficiency of the labor market. We empirically examine the cause of matching friction based 
on the theory of directed search model such as Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001). From rich 
micro data on vacancy size and wage variation of job changers in Japanese labor market, we 
observe the negative relationship between vacancy size and offered wage, which show the 
existence of search friction, not in the whole labor market but in some particular unskilled 
markets, especially those of clerks and production workers. 
 
 
Key Words:  
Search friction, matching, directed search, vacancy, wage offer, Japan. 
 
JEL Classification Code:  
J63, J31, J42.   3
1. INTRODUCTION 
As in many countries, the natural unemployment rate of Japan has rapidly risen through 
the 1990s due to the decline in matching efficiency of the labor market. For example, UV 
analysis shows the shift of the aggregate matching function during this period; in other words, 
fewer jobs were formed even with the same number of vacancies and job seekers as before. 
In effect, newly created employment dropped and unemployed people remained longer in the 
market.
2 
Such recognition naturally induces us to try to improve the matching efficiency in the 
labor market, which would lead to a recovery in market performance as well. Under the 
presupposition that the key to improving matching efficiency is the speed of information 
transmission, we have spent much time and money in changing the relevant institutions. 
Accordingly, in 1998 new information technology was introduced by public agencies; this 
contained a searchable database on vacancy information that could be shared through 
networks, made a part of the vacancy information available on the internet, and shared the 
above information with private employment agencies. In 1999, the public monopoly of the 
job placement service was abandoned for the first time in 61 years. 
Unfortunately, the effects of these efforts are not so obvious. For instance, job matching 
achieved by private employment agencies has been about 300,000 a year, or less than 20% of 
matching by the public agencies, and the trend for the total number shows no increase from 
1998FY.
3 In addition, the proportion of new employees hired thorough private employment 
                                                 
2 Sasaki (2004) and Kondou and Genda (2003) discuss in detail the Japanese empirical references. 
3 Actual numbers of matching recorded at public job centers are 1,667,986 in 1998FY, 1,762,950 in 1999FY, 
1,868,742 in 2000FY, 1,902,981 in 2001FY, 2,048,300 in 2002FY, and 2,153,796 in 2003FY for regular workers 
(i.e., except new graduates and including part-time workers).   4
agencies only amounts to 1–2% to the total.
4 Public service through the Internet remains low, 
the matching number being as little as 1,360 per month on average during 2003 FY. These 
facts suggest that a simple increase in the variety of search methods or in the speed of 
information transmission would not necessarily improve matching efficiency in the labor 
market. 
These policies have been based on a fundamental assumption that economic agents 
match together under some specific technology. In other words, it is considered that matching 
is technologically determined in the same way that production is determined by a production 
function. Therefore, matching productivity should be enhanced if new methods are 
introduced or if IT investments are executed for the matching process, just as the introduction 
of new technology or IT investment on a production line would improve productivity. 
However, the failure of these policies suggests that such a simple technology-determined idea 
for the matching process should be abandoned. 
In this research, we utilize the discussion on endogeneity of matching functions, which 
argues that matching efficiency in labor markets depends not only on exogenous 
technological conditions (for example, speed of information transmission among agents), but 
also on interdependency among individual agents in the market. In particular, our main theme 
is to confirm empirically that the abovementioned mechanism is actually working in the 
Japanese labor market. 
The sections below are organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our empirical 
hypothesis by showing that there could exist negative relations between the size of vacancies 
posted at each firm and the offered wage levels, applying directed search models that provide 
                                                 
4 The proportion amounts to 0.9% in 2000FY, 1.2% in 2001FY, 1.7% in 2002FY, and 1.6% in 2003FY 
(“Employment Trend Survey” by the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare).   5
a theoretical base for most endogenous matching functions. Section 3 briefly explains the 
dataset created from the “Employment Trend Survey”. In Section 4, we present our empirical 
model based on the hypothesis derived in Section 2. The estimation results are summarized in 
Section 5, and Section 6 concludes. 
2. HYPOTHESIS: VACANCY SIZE AND POSTED WAGE LEVEL 
In this section, we first introduce the discussion on endogenous matching function, and 
then show how the empirical proposition that “there exists a negative correlation between 
posted wage level and vacancy size” could be derived from the discussion. 
The usual discussion on matching efficiency in the labor market focuses on how many 
matchings would be generated from a certain number of vacancies and job seekers. Many 
theoretical researchers assume some specific functions among these three variables, precisely 
functions of homogeneous degree one. At the same time, such functions that are 
homogeneous of degree one, which had simply been theoretically assumed at first, have been 
observed in various pieces of empirical research. Therefore, researchers have come to share a 
common understanding that matching functions have the shape of an “aggregate matching 
function” (AMF) that is homogeneous of degree one (Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001). 
Of course, many questions have been raised from an empirical viewpoint in estimating 
such AMF, such as that the estimation bias might exist only when stock variables are used in 
estimation, or when estimation results are unstable by region and by phases of business cycle 
(Coles and Smith (1996, 1998)).
5 There have been some theoretical attempts to solve these 
questions. As a result, instead of assuming ad hoc functional relations for vacancies, job 
                                                 
5 Nakamura (2002) also observe the downward shift of matching functions during recessions in Japan. Kano and 
Ohta (2005) point out the existence of regional discrepancy of matching efficiency in the Japanese labor market 
by estimating the regional UV curve.   6
seekers and matching at an aggregated level, a new analytical approach has been proposed 
that formulates individual behavior as well as matching rules in the market, and leading to an 
ex-post aggregate AMF. In this context, AMF is not a technological device, but is generated 
endogenously through each agent’s behavior. Research has revealed that the assumption of 
random search without any interdependency among agents would play an essential role in 
deriving a stable AMF that is homogeneous degree one.
6 
In other words, if we drop the assumption of random search and/or independence of 
agents, AMF would not necessarily be homogeneous degree one and would change its shape 
depending on phases of the business cycle. 
For example, employers would send signals to the labor market based on the predicted 
responses of other employers and of job seekers. Usually, this signal is interpreted as job 
conditions attached to each vacancy, such as wages or working hours. As a result, various 
vacancies with various conditions might appear in the job market at the same time, and each 
vacancy could receive applications from job seekers. In this situation, employers would try to 
control other agents’ strategy by changing working conditions. 
Many researchers discuss posted wage levels at recruitment as a working condition.
7 
Montgomery (1991) and Moen (1997) define the equilibrium condition as job seekers 
obtaining a certain amount of expected utility, whichever vacancy they applied for. In their 
theory, the expected utility, which is equal to the product of posted wage and hiring 
probability, would be determined by the exogenous outside option. Intuitively, high posted 
wages would attract more applicants and thus lead to lower hiring probability, while low 
                                                 
6 The derivation of AMF is discussed in Albrecht, Tan, Gautier and Vroman (2004). 
7 Most research uses wage levels as signals. Offered wages play an important role in actual classifieds, and such 
theoretical approximation is acceptable. However, we must always be aware that wage levels are not the only 
factors attached to vacancies.   7
wages would lead to fewer applicants and higher hiring probability. The aim of the 
theoretical work is to consider which combination of posted wage and application probability 
would hold in equilibrium. 
Within this, what becomes important is the “large market assumption.” This assumption 
considers it difficult for posted wages to coordinate thoroughly when the sizes of both 
vacancies and job seekers are large enough. Take an example of n homogeneous vacancies 
and n homogeneous job seekers in the market. When the market can coordinate perfectly in 
this case, n homogeneous job seekers could decide where to apply without any multiplication 
with each other. Namely, even if they are completely homogeneous, we describe the situation 
as a “perfectly coordinated market” if job seekers could cooperate with each other by using 
some tools (such as ex-ante meetings). However, when n is large enough, or when it is 
difficult for agents to communicate with each other, it is rather realistic to assume ideal 
coordination does not hold, and an overlap of job seekers would be generated for certain 
vacancies. The assumption of large labor markets would directly lead to the implication of 
“coordination failure” in the market, which leads to inefficient resource allocation. In other 
words, the labor market friction studied in search theory could be interpreted to be dependent 
on the assumption mentioned above of coordination failure. 
Montgomery (1991) assumes large markets and that an expected utility level guaranteed 
to job seekers is determined by market conditions as a whole, which is taken as given to each 
agent. He proved there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium such that every firm would 
post the same wage without ex-ante heterogeneity of employers. 
On the other hand, Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001) discuss how the change in posted 
wage levels would affect the expected utility level to be guaranteed to a job seeker even in 
large markets. Under this framework they examine the equilibrium implied by introducing   8
ex-post heterogeneity on the vacancy side, assuming that firms could choose the size of 
vacancy, and prove that all vacancies do not necessarily select identical size and wage levels, 
but vacancy sizes and wage levels distribute endogenously with negative correlations, even 
though they have an identical vacancy cost function. To put this in a different way, if one 
firm could post more than two vacancies at once, the assumptions conventionally regarded as 
standard would be insufficient to derive the true shape of matching functions (Burdett, Shi 
and Wright (2001) p. 1080.)
8 Intuitively, employers could place much weight on ex-post 
heterogeneity to job seekers by selecting the size of vacancies they post at one time. Greater 
vacancy size would allow employers to hold wages at a low level, since they could offer 
higher hiring probability for job seekers (given that other things are equal). This would lead 
to the situation in which employers with larger vacancies and smaller vacancies coexist ex 
post when they determine vacancy size, although they are identical with the same profit 
opportunities ex ante. 
Therefore, when there are frictions in the market in the sense that perfect coordination is 
not achievable, vacancy sizes and wage levels may have negative relations. 
3. DATA 
In this research, we use microdata of the Employment Trend Survey (hereafter ETS) by 
the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare for the years 1993–1995, in order to investigate if 
the negative relationship between offered wages and vacancy sizes discussed in the previous 
section actually holds in the Japanese labor market. 
                                                 
8 Albrecht, Tan, Gautier and Vroman (2004) relax the limitation on simultaneous applications by job seekers in a 
standard matching model. In addition, Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001) assume vacancy numbers are controllable 
for employers who move first, while Albrecht, Tan, Gautier and Vroman (2004) increase the number of possible 
applications sent by job seekers, and these differences have led to variant conclusions.   9
ETS surveys worker flow at establishment level for the preceding six months twice a 
year (first half: January 1–June 30, second half: July 1–December 31). The establishments 
surveyed are those with more then five regular workers of nine major industries. Sample size 
would be around 10,000 establishments each year with around 70,000 to 100,000 outflow and 
inflow workers. In addition, all establishments over 500 employees are surveyed. 
This survey covers establishment, inflow worker, outflow worker, and additional 
information. The establishment questionnaire asks the basic attributes such as industry 
classification, employee size, and location, as well as the flow of regular workers during the 
period surveyed. In other words, the number of regular workers at the end of the last period, 
the number of inflow and outflow workers during the period, and the number of regular 
workers at the end of this period are inquired by sex and by job category. The inflow worker 
questionnaire randomly asks the inflow workers about their attributes. Although the detailed 
questions vary year by year, they generally contain age, sex, education and occupation, as 
well as previous industry where employed, previous occupation, job-search route, 
unemployment period, and wage change for job changers. On the other hand the outflow 
questionnaire is sent to the personnel office to ask the characteristics and reason of quitters. 
The additional questionnaire is distributed only at the end of the first half of each year and 
surveys the stock numbers of regular workers by sex, age category, and occupation as at June 
30, as well as the number of unsatisfied vacancies.
9 
In this research, we estimate wage levels at recruitment for inflow workers by utilizing 
wage changes of job changers from inflow worker questionnaires. At the same time, we also 
assess the vacancy size posted by the particular establishment during that period, and see 
their relations statistically. However, these estimation results are heavily dependent on the 
                                                 
9 From the first half of 1998 the additional questionnaire was absorbed into the establishment questionnaire.   10
technology owned by the establishment. In order to control for these effects, we constructed a 
panel dataset of establishments through 1993–1995, which depicts the history of outflow and 
inflow of workers by each establishment, so that we could see the unobservable individual 
effects for each establishment on wage change. In addition, since unsatisfied vacancies are 
observable only at the first half of each year, we need to confine our sample to data for the 
first half year and consider the relationship between vacancy sizes and wage changes for the 
first half. 
The establishment questionnaire tabulated as many as 11,155 establishments for the 
first half of 1993, 11,148 for 1994 and 11,233 for 1995, but we drop from the sample those 
without consistency with the additional questionnaire, those that miss the target variables, 
those that disappeared during the three years, and government establishments.
10 Finally, we 
obtained a panel database of 4,687 establishments. With regard to inflow workers, we select 
samples of job changers whose wage change is known, but eliminate workers newly 
employed by the government. For our estimation, we cannot use samples of either new 
graduates, the previously self-employed, or those unemployed for longer than one year, as we 
do not have any information on wage changes. 
Appendix Table 1.1 and 1.2 describe the summary statistics for those samples, and 
summarize the derivation method of variables used in our estimation. 
4. ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
Let the wage posted to jobseeker i who later earned after joining the establishment j 
denote wij
offer. Following Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001), wij
offer is dependent on worker i’s 
                                                 
10 In the case of government establishments, wage levels are determined by laws or regulations, so that they 
have no connection to the number of applications received by them.   11
attributes at matching (Xi
present) and establishment j’s vacancy size (vj), and could be 
expressed as the following (1). In this formulation, β1
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Regarding the demand shocks that establishments face that are dependent on industry, 
size, and location, it is quite natural to consider the posted wage levels wjk
offer as dependent on 
establishment j’s industry, size, and location. We introduce such demand-side variables as Yj. 










ij e u Y X v w + + + + + = 3 2 1 β β β α . 
 
As for Yj, we employ the establishment’s industry, size, and turnover rate resulting 
from private reasons. As Brown and Medoff (1989) point out, it has been usually observed 
that (average) wage levels vary by industry or by establishment size. Burdett and Mortensen 
(1998) propose that the wage level would affect density of on-the-job search among current 
workers and thus they would have some effect on the turnover rate caused by employees’ 
private reasons. To be precise, workers at establishments with high wages do not put much 
effort into on-the-job search activities, since they find it more difficult to find better job 
opportunities even though they keep on searching good job offers. As a result, the turnover 
rate at such establishments would be smaller. If the establishments offer relatively low wages, 
then the reverse will be the case, so that they face higher turnover rates. In this paper, we 
estimate turnover rates resulting from private reasons from the questionnaire on displaced   12
workers, and use that as one of the explanatory variables.
11 In addition to Yj, we can use 
establishment fixed effects uj as well to control the unobservable technological shock to 
offered wage. 
Let recruitment activities be planned at the beginning of each year for the coming six 
months, and be unchanged through that period. vj is actually derived by summing the number 
of inflow workers during that term and unsatisfied vacancies left at the end of June. 
As explained above, if the directed search model discussed in section 2 actually holds, 
our goal for the estimation is to examine empirically if this sign is actually negative in 
formulation (2). In other words, if we consider that we could control firm-specific factors by 
Yj and fixed effects uj, then our main concern would be to test the hypothesis empirically that 
vacancy size and wage level are indeed negatively correlated. 
While we could observe vj directly from the questionnaire to establishments, we 
unfortunately could not see wij
offer directly from the questionnaire to incoming workers, but 
could only observe the wage change level (relative to previous wages) by five categories. We 
can decompose the wage change level into two parts, i.e., wages at displacement and posted 
wages at job change. We can then construct an estimation method as follows. 
At the first stage, we simulate worker i’s wage level at displacement wi
past by a Mincer-
type wage function using workers’ attributes when s/he left the job. In other words, if we 
                                                 
11 In the ETS, the outflow questionnaire asks the reason for leaving work from among 11 reasons, such as 
“expiration of contract term”, “management decision”, etc. We assume displaced workers as the result of job-
seeking activities while at previous work are those whose reason corresponds to “other private reasons”, so that 
we derived the voluntary turnover rate for each establishment by multiplying overall turnover rate and the 
proportion of workers who chose “other private reasons”.   13
denote worker i’s attributes at the time of displacement Xi
past, we could write estimation 









i e X w + + = β α . 
 
Here, ei
past is unobservable factors for econometrician and α
p is constant. We use the 
questionnaire of incoming workers for Xi
past variables, such as age, education, sex, previous 
job, previous firm size, and previous industry. In total, we summarize the result by denoting 
wage change as wij
offer-wij
past at job change in the following way: 
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Of course, it is possible that wages at survey and offered wages are different because of 
wage increases. However, there is only six months’ difference between the surveyed timing 
and offered point, so that we do not need to believe there might exist either large or 
systematic difference between these two wages (wij
offer = wij
present). Similarly, we assume that 
basic attributes of job seekers do not change at displacement and at recruitment, thus we 
rewrite the estimation equation as follows: 
 




ij e u Y X v w w + + + + + = − 2 1 β β β α . 
 
β1
0 in (1), the major theme of this estimation, could be derived as βv from panel 
estimation of (5) with establishments’ fixed effects uj. We could determine that market   14
friction, arising from search activities, actually exists in labor markets as directed search 
models predict, if βv is estimated to be negative. 
β1, the estimated coefficients, includes effects on both offered wage (2) and previous 
wage (3), so their signs are not ex-ante obvious. Previous studies have shown that the older 
the worker or the greater the size of previous firm (Nakamura, 2002, Table 7), the greater the 
wage decrease experienced by that worker would be, as is the case with workers with lower 
educational levels (Kodama, Higuchi, Abe, Matsuura and Sunada, 2004). Therefore, we 
assume the depreciation level of human capital at job change by such workers is rather higher 
than for other workers.
12 
 
5. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
5.1. Basic results 
Table 1 shows the estimation result of (5), using the sampled experienced full-time job 
changers during the first half of each year from 1993 to 1995. As the vacancy variable, we 
used permanent full-time vacancies for each establishment and the turnover rate caused by 
private reasons among full-time workers. The detailed derivation of these variables from row 
data is discussed in the appendix. 
(1a) shows that both worker attributes and turnover rates of full-time workers at each 
establishment have significant coefficients with expected signs, so we could consider that the 
model itself has explanatory power to some extent. On the contrary, the coefficient of full-
                                                 
12 Nakamura (2002) reports that there are no statistically significant relationships between UV ratio and wage 
increase at job change, and suggests that individual attributes rather than market conditions are relevant in the 
Japanese labor market.   15
time vacancy size on which we have been focusing is estimated to be positive (0.0005), and 
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that coefficients are equal to zero in a statistical sense (p-
value 0.105). Therefore, we cannot empirically confirm that β1
0 in estimation formula (1a) is 
negative, so that there does not exist negative relations between vacancy sizes and offered 
wage levels. 
5.2. Measurement of vacancy size 
We now discuss the measurement method of vacancy, which might have affected the 
estimation result of Section 5.1’s conclusion. In theory, the vacancy should be conceived as 
such that a job applicant would compete with other job seekers. For example, when 
experienced job seekers think new graduates are not their rivals, it may not be appropriate to 
include such different job postings into a vacancy variable. Because we cannot classify which 
job posting is different from others for an experienced job applicant in our data, we use 
various vacancy variables to confirm the estimation results in Table (1a). 
In estimation (1a), we assumed full-time new graduates and full-time job changers are 
not in the same labor market due to Japanese labor market customs, and used the latter 
numbers for estimation. In estimation (1b) in Table1, we assume both job applicants, i.e., job 
changers and new graduates, are in the same labor market, so add vacancy numbers for both 
and use the total number as the vacancy size that job seekers face and estimated formula (5). 
The result is almost the same as (1b), and the coefficient we are interested in is positive 
(0.0002) with insignificant p-value (0.476). Again, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
the coefficient is equal to zero. 
Other than new graduates, the job changers of the ETS include job seekers who do not 
have any work experience after graduation as well as those who have found jobs after a 
period of long-term unemployment (longer than one year). Among these are females who left   16
the labor market in mid career.
13 An experienced job changer might not pay much attention to 
such job seekers who have some blank periods in their careers. Accordingly, we tried another 
estimation by using the number of vacancies only for direct job changers as a proxy for full-
time vacancies. This is depicted in (1c) in Table1 and shows quite similar results to (1a) and 
(1b). While the coefficient of vacancy size is negative, it is not statistically significant (p-
value 0.647). 
As stated above, we should use vacancy size at the beginning of the year as the 
explanatory variable if possible, but we need to substitute that number by an estimation on 
some assumptions because of the limitations of the dataset. In order to confirm if such 
estimation has influenced the estimation result, we employed the unsatisfied vacancy 
numbers at the end of the first half that could be directly observed as a proxy for vacancy size. 
The result is shown in (1d) in Table1. Here again we cannot see any particular difference 
between results (1a) and (1c), i.e., the coefficient of full-time unsatisfied vacancies is positive 
(0.0013), and neither can we reject the null hypothesis (p-value 0.397). 
In conclusion, the difference in vacancy measurement, for example whether new 
graduates are included or not, or whether we could regard vacancies through the period as a 
whole or not, does not affect the conclusion derived in Section 5.1. We accordingly use full-
time vacancies as vacancy size in the following estimations, except for the cases we noted. 
 
                                                 
13 Actually, among inflow workers during Jan–June of 1993–1995, male workers account for 58.4% and young 
workers below 25 account for 25.5% of job changers, while these proportions are 35.9% and 43.3% 
correspondingly with respect to entering workers.   17
5.3. Establishments and worker attributes 
The most important process for the empirical framework above is to control particular 
demand shocks for each establishment by using establishments’ attributes Yj and fixed effects 
uj. In order to check the robustness of the conclusion derived in the estimation in Section 5.1, 
we need to check if such demand shocks have sufficiently been controlled by establishments’ 
attributes (industry, size, turnover rate, location) and fixed effects. For this purpose, the 
estimation results of (5) with various combinations of fixed effects and observable 
establishments’ attributes have been derived, and are shown in Table 2. 
At first, the result without any establishment attributes is the case (2a). Without any 
control for establishment attributes, vacancy size would have a positive impact on offered 
wage level. If we assume that we could control supply shocks on the worker side by using 
worker attributes, location, and trend as a control, estimation (2a) suggests the combination of 
wages and new employment under various levels of labor demand. Therefore, the positive 
sign mentioned above could be interpreted as the labor supply curve that each establishment 
faces has a positive slope. 
Next, (2b) describes the case with only fixed effects of establishments, and (2c) shows 
the case with only observable establishment attributes. On the one hand, when we control 
only fixed effects, a seemingly positive correlation has been maintained. On the other hand, 
when we control only observable establishments’ attributes, such as industry or size, the 
impact of vacancy size on offered wages declines relative to the results of (2a) or (2b), and 
becomes statistically insignificant. This suggests that establishment attributes are more 
effective in controlling the demand shocks that each firm faces. In addition, results (2d) and 
(2e) suggest establishment size and industries’ locations are more effective in controlling   18
demand shock than are turnover rates. In any case, we deduce that demand shocks for 
establishments could have been fairly removed by fixed effects and establishment attributes. 
On the other side, when we interpret estimation (2a) as the explanation of wage change 
at job transfer, it becomes important for workers how to choose new industry, new job, and 
new establishment size. Precisely, when workers are moving between different jobs or 
industries, or diminishing establishment size, they would be more likely to earn smaller 
wages than before (Nakamura, 2002). Therefore, estimation (2f) and (2g) in Table 2 focus on 
whether workers have changed jobs, industries, or sizes from their previous employment. 
In estimation (2f), after including current industry, job, and size in the estimation, we 
add the dummy variables as explanatory variables to indicate if such attributes of the previous 
job are different from current ones. Therefore, previous industry, job, and size are excluded 
from the estimation. We created different dummies for upward and downward movements of 
establishment size to distinguish the impact from each case. The estimation result indicates 
that with job alternation or with downward movement of size, wages tend to decrease. With 
industry change, wages tend to decline as well, although this is not significant. On the 
contrary, the upward movement of size would lead to an increase in the wage after a job 
change; in general, these results fit the results from previous studies. In these cases, the 
vacancy size affect offered wages positively in a significant way, compared with case (1a). In 
estimation (2g), we used previous industry, job, and size as well as dummies for the changes 
between positions as explanatory variables, and excluded present industry, job, and size. The 
result of (2g) is almost the same as (2f), and the coefficient of vacancy on offered wage is 
also positive.   19
5.4. Estimation by occupation 
It is possible that job seekers regard vacancies in different jobs even at the same firm as 
different vacancies. If this holds, vacancy size as the sum of vacancies of all jobs at one 
establishment always exceeds vacancy size of one job, thus the coefficient for vacancy might 
have been overestimated. Therefore, we divide the data by eight jobs, and re-estimate (5) for 
each job. The results are shown in Table (3a)–(3h). In these estimations, we used vacancy 
size for each job as an explanatory variable, as well as turnover rate for each job. Care must 
be taken with interpreting the result, however, since we cannot separate full-time vacancies 
from part-time vacancies because of data reliability. In addition, turnover rate by job is not 
available solely for full-time workers or for reason.
14 
In general, the estimation result is not stable. There are no cases in which all worker 
attributes have significant coefficients as predicted, and turnover rate by job also shows 
unstable coefficients. However, there are no cases for vacancy size by job in which positive 
coefficients have been derived; in fact, they are significantly negative for clerks and sales 
jobs and negative for security, communication and transportation, and production, although in 
these cases they are insignificant. This might suggest the existence of different sources of 
friction by job, given that labor markets are divided by job. We could assume from the above 
result that, in the case of technology or management jobs, which require more skill than 
others, matchings are taking place similar to the random search case, or coordination has 
                                                 
14 The number of inflow workers is around six on average per establishment in our dataset. By using such 
information, a relatively large number of samples correspond to zero when we calculate proportions of workers 
by job and by displacement reason. As a result, we cannot maintain sufficient variation in explanatory variables 
and cannot obtain stable estimation results. For instance, we employed only managers for our samples in 
estimation 13; simple turnover rate for managers by establishment was equal to zero with 251 out of 829 
samples (30.1%), while managers turnover rate by private reason was equal to zero with 343 samples (41.4%).   20
already been formed from the beginning, while in the case of clerks or sales jobs, which do 
not require many specific skills, the failure of coordination caused by interdependence 
between employers and job seekers might lead to mismatch. 
Of course, we need to be very careful about the above interpretation as the estimation 
results do not seem to be robust. For example, since we divide samples by job, there might 
have been serious sample selection bias with regard to workers’ attributes. Nonetheless, it is 
not ex-ante clear how much such sample bias might have affected the result. Therefore, we 
could at least assume it might be possible that different frictional sources exist for each job 
caused by coordination failure. 
5.5. Endogeneity 
In order to derive a consistent estimator of β
v by fixed-effects estimator, the interested 
explanatory variable vj should be independent of error term eij. 
eij is the difference between eij
offer derived from (2) and ei
past derived from (3). From the 
assumption of (2), eij
offer is independent of vj. On the other side, ei
past describes the 
unobservable ability of a displaced worker, which is reflected in wage level at displacement. 
If there exists some mechanism with which larger vacancies would attract workers with better 
skills, then vj and eij are positively correlated, yielding negative bias in the estimation of β
v. 
Although this might be the case, the conclusion derived from (1a) is such that there are 
no negative relations between vacancy and posted wage, given that β
v is positive. Thus, the 
abovementioned bias would not affect our discussion in a serious way. On the contrary, 
discussion on the case in Section 5.3 in which the relevant variables sometimes have negative 
coefficients makes clear that we must be more careful about the interpretation of the results. 
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5.6. Sample selection bias
15 
In the discussion on endogeneity in Section 5.5, we discuss the possibility that eij might 
be correlated to vj when the distribution of eij reflects the population as a whole. In this 
section, we consider the possibility that eij’s distribution does not reflect the entire population, 
caused by the fact that samples are limited to experienced job changers. 
Whether a worker decides to change jobs is originally a choice variable, and we can 
assume a worker would make that decision after observing the vacancy size distribution of 
this period. Moreover, let eij from (5) be interpreted as profits at job change, which is 
unobservable by econometricians. In this case, if the true relationship between vacancy size 
and offered wage is negative, then a greater vacancy size would suggest a lower probability 
of wage increase at job change on average for workers who are considering the opportunity 
of job change. Under these circumstances, if some workers have actually changed their jobs 
with large vacancies, they could be expecting large eij. This leads to a positive correlation 
between vj and eij, and yields a positive bias on β
v estimation. Conversely, if true relations 
between vacancy and offered wage are negative, then similar reasoning expects negative 
correlations between vj and eij, yielding negative bias on the β
v estimation. Overall, the 
discussion on selection bias caused by endogeneity of job change decision by workers 
suggests that the β
v estimation result could be distorted to zero whichever the direction of 
correlations, which suggests a possible lack in the statistical power of the test of the null 
hypothesis that β
v is equal to zero. 
This might be problematic in our estimation, because eij includes ei
past. As we discussed 
above, ei
past itself corresponds to workers’ abilities at displacement. Once they have observed 
(distribution of) vacancy size, workers might decide whether they should change jobs taking 
                                                 
15 Discussion in this section depends on remarks from Daiji Kawaguchi. We appreciate his comments.   22
into account their individual abilities. Let the true relations between vacancy size and offered 
wage be positive. Under this assumption, workers who have held large ei
past in the sense that 
their abilities were highly evaluated at displacement might change jobs with relatively large 
vacancy sizes. In this case, vj and ei
past have positive relations, thus vj and eij are negatively 
correlated, and negative bias is caused in estimating β
v. Similarly, if we assume the true 
relationship would be negative, then vj and eij have a positive correlation, and positive bias is 
caused in estimating β
v. In these cases, no matter what the true relations are, the β
v estimation 
result could be distorted to zero in any case, which suggests a possible lack in the 
effectiveness of the test of the null hypothesis that β
v is equal to zero. 
In order to examine the plausibility of the above discussion we re-estimate (5), limiting 
the sample to workers who have left their jobs because of “mandatory retirement, dismissal, 
or end of contract.” In case of dismissal, the decision whether a worker changes her/his job is 
determined exogenously, thus the decision of job change and ei
past is not so strongly 
correlated compared with the case when workers choose to change their jobs by themselves. 
The estimation result is (4a) in Table 4 for all occupations, providing significant and greater 
positive coefficients for vacancy size. Results (4b) and (4c) describe the case for service 
workers and production workers, respectively. Comparing these results with the previous 
ones ((3e) and (3h), respectively), the absolute value of vacancy coefficients has become 
greater with higher significance levels. These results suggest there might be sample selection 
bias as discussed in this section. 
In any case, we could at least presume that the coefficient of vacancy size takes the 
value from (1a) and (4c), although selection bias of both kinds has actually taken place. In 
other words, it is not negative, and this implies friction from coordination failure is not 
necessarily important in the Japanese labor market. Furthermore, it sometimes has negative   23
value with service workers or production workers, thus the pattern of friction by job evidently 
varies in each labor market. 
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
As far as is implied by the estimation results, we should not overestimate the 
importance of interdependence among job seekers and employers in the Japanese labor 
market. In that sense, recent policies that try to improve matching efficiency from a technical 
viewpoint are reasonable and have some rationale. 
On the other hand, in cases such as clerks and production workers, who are generally 
regarded as relatively low-skilled workers, the wage variations actually observed are 
significantly explained by the variation in vacancies, and moreover, that sign is not 
contradictory to the existence of search friction arising from interdependence between job 
seekers and employers. In such instances, the relative size of vacancies might affect 
applicants’ behavior or other employers’ recruitment, and play the role of public signals. 
Therefore, matching of unskilled workers possibly may not lead to the improvement of 
matching technology in a direct way, so that it is more important to control the 
interdependence between job seekers and employers and to take the direction with fewer 
market frictions. 
With regard to skilled workers such as engineers or managers, the wage variation 
cannot be explained by vacancy size. This primarily suggests that the model of Burdett, Shi 
and Wright (2001) does not hold with these occupations, and the discussion might be roughly 
amplified to the following three possibilities. 
The first case is that the part of vacancy size unexplainable by demand or supply factors 
does not make much sense to either workers or employers, and they bargain with each other   24
by using other information. The second case might be that search frictions caused by these 
skilled occupations are mainly caused by random search. The third case is that frictions do 
not exist with these skilled jobs, as they are perfectly coordinated via job centers and private 
referrals. In fact, around 62% of engineers and 90% of managers find new jobs within two 
weeks of displacement, numbers vastly different from those for production workers (37%) 
and service workers (20%). If they are directed by another indicator instead of vacancy size, 
or if they are in a random match situation, such quick matching speed is not achievable, 
compared with the case with production or service workers. 
Of course, we could think of various interesting issues, including that search frictions 
from different sources by occupation have come to be apparent from the 1990s, or the level to 
which they have contributed to the background of the rapid rise in unemployment rates in the 
overall market. While this paper does not provide direct answers to such questions, it does 
aim to raise the importance on different sides from the technical issues that have been 
traditionally discussed. In particular, if there is much bargaining going on among job seekers 
instead of random search, it would be unrealistic to expect to clear this mismatch simply by 
IT investment. In this case, what is more important would be to control the bargaining 
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Appendix A: Explanatory Variables 
Some of the explanatory variables in the estimation have been created as follows. 
 
<Proportion of Occupation among Inflow and Outflow Workers> 
The “Employment Trend Survey” asks both the numbers of inflow workers during Jan–June 
and the proportion of occupation among workers within each establishment at the end of June, 
while this survey does not ask the proportion of occupation among inflow workers during 
these six months. However, the inflow worker questionnaire surveys occupation for each 
worker, so that we recover the occupational structure among inflow workers by using inflow 
questionnaires (including part-time workers) and derive inflow worker rates by occupation at 
establishment level. Similar methods have been applied in the case of occupational structure 
of outflow workers. 
 
<Vacancy Size by Occupation> 
By using the above occupational structure, we derived the numbers of inflow workers by 
occupation as a result of multiplication of proportion and total number of inflow workers 
(including part-time workers, Jan–June). Then we added unsatisfied vacancy numbers to 
these inflow numbers by occupation, giving vacancy size by occupation during the first half 
of each year. As for the numbers of displaced workers by occupation during the same period, 
we multiplied the total number of outflow workers for each occupation by occupational ratio 
derived in a similar way as the inflow workers’ case. 
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<Proportion of New Graduates> 
Following the same method as for occupational ratio, we calculated the rates of new 
graduates from the inflow worker questionnaire by establishment, and then obtained the 
number of inflow workers who were new graduates by multiplying these with total inflow 
workers’ numbers (full-time workers). There were very few workers who got part-time jobs 
as new graduates. In addition, the number of workers remaining after subtracting the number 
of new graduates from the number of full-time workers we classify as mid-career workers.   28
Appendix B-1: Summary Statistics (Worker Attribute) 
sample size average s. d. min. max.
Industry 11265 42.53 27.96 5 94 2 digit
Establishment Size 11265 2.00 0.81 1 4
Firm Size 11265 2.45 1.19 1 5
Sex 11265 1.30 0.46 1 2
Age 11265 5.09 2.63 1 11
Graduates 11265 2.28 0.95 1 4
Recruit Route 11265 4.79 2.33 1 8
Occupation 11265 5.26 2.77 1 9
Previous Industry 11265 5.79 2.12 1 9
Previous Occupation 11265 5.00 2.74 1 9
Working Status 11265 1.07 0.25 1 2
Unemployment Period 11236 2.35 1.39 1 5
Previous Firm Size 11265 3.13 1.48 1 6
Wage Variation 11265 2.95 0.85 5 1
junior high=1, high=2, junior college=3, university=4
public job center=1, school=2, previous employer=3,
shukko=4, return from shukko=5, private network=6,
advertisement=7, others=8
tech=1, manager=2, clerk=3, sales=4, service=5,
sequrity guard=6, transportation=7, production=8,
others=9
under -30%=1ɺ-30% to -10%=2, -10% to +10%=3,
+10% to +30%=4, over +30%=5
under 15days=1, 15-30days=2, 1-3month=3, 3-
6month=4, 6-12month=5


















tech=1, manager=2, clerk=3, sales=4, service=5,
sequrity guard=6, transportation=7, production=8,
fulltime=1, parttime=2
over 500=1, 100-499=2, 30-99=3, 5-29=4
over 1000=1, 300-999=2, 100-299=3, 30-99=4, 5-
29=5
male=1, female=2
1 digit: agriculture=1, mining=2, construction=3,
manufacture=4, transportation=5,
retail/wholesale/restaurant=6, finance=7, service=8,
under 19=1, ŋŋŋ,  over 65=11
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Appendix B-2: Summary Statistics (Establishment Attribute) 
sample size average s. d. min. max.
over all 11265 601.92 1124.28 8 21623
fulltime 11265 565.75 1104.98 0 21346
parttime 11265 25.84 88.83 0 1113
overall 11265 56.15 111.08 0 1801
fulltime 11265 51.27 107.11 0 1801
parttime 11265 4.88 23.23 0 410
technitian 11265 0.15 0.26 0 1
manger 11265 0.04 0.11 0 1
clerk 11265 0.17 0.25 0 1
sales 11265 0.04 0.14 0 1
service 11265 0.14 0.30 0 1
sequrity guard 11265 0.01 0.08 0 1
transportation 11265 0.05 0.18 0 1
production 11265 0.35 0.40 0 1
others 11265 0.05 0.15 0 1
over all 11265 42.68 81.11 0 1364
fulltime 11265 38.20 75.83 0 1286
parttime 11265 4.48 18.94 0 315
technitian 11265 0.12 0.25 0 1
manger 11265 0.07 0.15 0 1
clerk 11265 0.17 0.25 0 1
sales 11265 0.04 0.13 0 1
service 11265 0.13 0.30 0 1
sequrity guard 11265 0.02 0.08 0 1
transportation 11265 0.05 0.19 0 1
production 11265 0.35 0.41 0 1
others 11265 0.05 0.17 0 1
end of contract term 11265 0.12 0.25 0 1
restructuring 11265 0.02 0.10 0 1
shukko 11265 0.05 0.15 0 1
return from shukko 11265 0.03 0.11 0 1
mandatory retirement 11265 0.10 0.19 0 1
EJTNJTTBM 11265 0.02 0.11 0 1
QFSTPOBMSFBTPO 11265 0.53 0.36 0 1
marriage 11265 0.05 0.12 0 1
DIJMECJSUI 11265 0.03 0.09 0 1
GBNJMZIFBMUIDBSF 11265 0.01 0.04 0 1
EFBUI 11265 0.03 0.08 0 1
over all 11265 3.22 9.86 0 150
fulltime 11265 2.87 9.09 0 150
parttime 11265 0.35 2.91 0 150
overall 11265 59.37 113.32 0 1801
technitian 11265 43.87 87.39 0 1222
manger 11265 54.37 108.91 0 1765.686
clerk 11265 47.16 100.70 0 1341.922
sales 11265 54.53 110.03 0 1801
service 11265 47.26 107.15 0 1801
sequrity guard 11265 55.39 109.96 0 1801
transportation 11265 54.54 110.11 0 1801
production 11265 40.93 84.62 0 1765.686
other occupation 11265 54.35 109.23 0 1553.804
fulltime 11265 54.14 109.06 0 1801
parttime 11265 5.23 24.24 0 425
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